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Border Adjustment Measures in Proposed
U.S. Climate Change Legislation –
“A New Chapter in America’s Leadership on Climate Change?”

1

by Stephen Kho, Bernd G. Janzen & Holly M. Smith*
“Delay is no longer an option. Denial is no longer an
acceptable response. The stakes are too high. The consequences,
too serious.”2
—President Barack Obama

A

Introduction

ll legislative proposals for a U.S. greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions cap-and-trade system released to
date have recognized the need to safeguard the competitiveness of U.S. firms that may be required to bear emissions
compliance burdens heavier than those borne by their foreign
competitors. These legislative proposals have included “competitiveness measures” to ensure
that emissions caps imposed
on U.S. industries do not erode
their competitiveness vis-à-vis
imports from jurisdictions with
no or lesser GHG emissions
restrictions. The problem of
“carbon leakage”—the incentive created by declining domestic emissions caps to move
emissions-intensive production
abroad—is particularly acute for
manufacturing industries. Many
such industries compete directly
with imports, and most would
not be able to pass on to their customers the increased costs
of compliance or the acquisition of more efficient production
technology. A properly designed U.S. climate change system
should therefore legally safeguard the competitiveness of U.S.
manufacturing industries, while also minimizing the incentive to
move emissions-intensive production abroad.
Competitiveness measures can take a variety of forms. For
instance, a “border adjustment” measure can impose costs on
relevant goods at the time they are imported into the United
States, assessed on the basis of either differences in the GHG
emission restrictions in the country of origin as compared to
the United States, or the emissions-intensity of the production
process for the imported goods. Other forms of competitiveness
measures include the free distribution of emissions allowances
to industries particularly sensitive to foreign competition, the
exemption of certain industries altogether from domestic emissions caps, the imposition of carbon taxes, and restrictions on

certain production methods or incentives to adopt cleaner production methods.
This article will focus on the use and consequences of a border adjustment measure, given that it is the competitiveness measure that is most consistently proposed in U.S. legislation, and
that seemingly has the most significant exposure to challenges
under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) agreements. This
article will first provide some background on the broader climate
change discussion in the United States. It will then discuss the
reasons for including competitiveness measures in U.S. climate
change legislation, the border adjustment measures included
in recent U.S. legislative proposals, and the viability of border
adjustment measures under the
WTO agreements. The article
will conclude with a new proposal for an alternative to the
border adjustment measures
proposed to date.

Domestic competitiveness
measures can ensure
the equal distribution of
costs in the absence of an
international agreement
limiting emissions.
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Background

The year 2009 promises to
be an exciting year for proponents of strong action to combat
GHG emissions in the United
States and internationally. Over
the past few years, broad political support for such legislation
has grown domestically, while international efforts have continued to progress, in large part without the participation of the
United States. Given the recent inauguration of Barack Obama
as President, and the goals of the international community to
conclude a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen in December of this year, real action is expected to be
taken in 2009 to limit carbon emissions both in the United States
and around the world.
* Stephen Kho is Senior Counsel at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, and
formerly Associate General Counsel and acting Chief Counsel on China Enforcement at the Office of U.S. Trade Representative, as well as Legal Advisor at the
U.S. Mission to the WTO. Bernd G. Janzen is Counsel at Akin Gump, and formerly Attorney-Advisor with the Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Holly M. Smith is an Associate
with Akin Gump, and formerly with the Office of the Deputy General Counsel
(International Affairs) at the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as with the
Asian Affairs Directorate in the National Security Council, Executive Office of the
U.S. President. The views expressed in this paper are personal to the authors, and
do not necessarily reflect those of their current or previous employers and clients.
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President Obama has made numerous statements to date
expressing his commitment to addressing climate change. In
spite of the uncertainty and turmoil caused by the ongoing financial crisis, he appears to be strongly committed to his original
proposals. Specifically, President Obama has called for the
implementation of an “economy-wide cap-and-trade program”
that will aim to reduce GHG emissions eighty percent by 2050.3
President Obama’s plan is distinguished by his calls for the auction of all emissions credits, unlike other plans, under which a
portion of credits would be provided at no cost to vulnerable
industries as a form of transition assistance. His plan differs further due to his policy of using a portion of the proceeds from
such emissions credit auctions (approximately $15 billion a
year) for investment in the “development of clean energy and
energy-efficiency improvements, including clean vehicles.”4
Importantly, President Obama has also pledged to “reengage”5 the international community through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). Since early
2007, international efforts to combat climate change have been
focused on developing a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, which remains in effect until 2012. Rounds of negotiations have been held, both to address the future commitments of
nations that have already been bound by emissions caps, as well
as to reach developing nations and countries such as the United
States that are not bound by the Kyoto Protocol. An important
breakthrough came at the negotiations in Bali in December 2007,
where it was decided that developing countries would not necessarily be excluded from future climate change control regimes.6
Other rounds of negotiations have taken place since, leading
ultimately to the negotiation of a final agreement in Copenhagen
at the 15th meeting of all Framework Convention parties in late
2009 that will replace the Kyoto Protocol.
Given the state of the economy, and previous difficulties
in passing legislation to establish a cap-and-trade system, there
are significant doubts over whether meaningful legislation curbing GHG emissions will be passed in the United States in 2009.
Yet the concurrence of the Obama presidency, the pressure to
have emissions limits in place domestically before concluding
an international agreement on emissions caps in Copenhagen,7
and the increased presence of Democrats in the U.S. Congress,
all indicate that the passage of climate change legislation is far
more likely now than at any time in the past.
Currently, Senator Barbara Boxer, Chairman of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee, and Representatives
Henry Waxman and Ed Markey, Chairs of the House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee and the Energy
and Environment Subcommittee respectively, are leading Congressional efforts to develop legislation addressing climate
change. On March 31, 2009, Representatives Waxman and Markey issued a discussion draft of their climate change legislation
entitled the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(the “Waxman-Markey draft”). While a draft has yet to come
out of the Senate, on February 3, 2009, Senator Boxer and other
committee members set out six basic principles for legislation
on global warming.8 It is likely that the draft produced in the

Smokestack of a coal-fired power plant in New York.
Senate will rely heavily on the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner substitute amendment (the “Boxer Amendment”) to the LiebermanWarner Climate Security Act of 2008 (“S.3036”), which was
originally introduced on May 21, 2008.9 Although the Boxer
Amendment has never been debated and considered in Congress to a significant extent,10 it represents the most advanced
and comprehensive legislative effort on the Senate side to date
addressing climate change.
Generally, both the Waxman-Markey draft and the Boxer
Amendment propose the establishment of a cap-and-trade system to limit emissions domestically, along with a number of
measures providing incentives for reduced emissions, and, in
the case of the Waxman-Markey draft, the development of clean
energy sources, clean technologies, and increased energy efficiency. Importantly, both bills provide for competitiveness measures in the form of a “border adjustment” requiring “covered
goods” imported into the United States to be accompanied by
purchases of emissions allowances.11

Rationale for Including
Competitiveness Provisions
While commentators have expressed concern over the inclusion of certain competitiveness provisions in climate change legislation,12 there are a number of reasons why such provisions are
useful and should be included in any proposed legislation.
First, competitiveness measures can provide an even playing field for U.S. manufacturers and producers to compete in the
domestic market against importers of goods from countries that
lack emissions caps. Manufacturers in countries such as China
and India, which are heavy polluters but currently are not subject to domestic or international limits on their emissions, would
enjoy a significant production cost advantage over their counterparts in the United States under a U.S. cap-and-trade regime if
no measures were taken to require these manufacturers to compensate for the emissions they created when producing products
for import into the U.S. market. In particular, energy-intensive
industries, such as cement, glass, paper, chemicals, fertilizer,
and metals manufacturers, would be adversely affected by U.S.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

declining emissions caps and their inability to compete with foreign producers who are not subject to such caps.13
The perceived need for protection of domestic manufacturers is so strong that is it highly unlikely that any climate change
legislation could pass the U.S. Congress without competitiveness measures. One reason given for the U.S. refusal to adopt the
Kyoto Protocol was the fact that it did not impose binding commitments on developing countries, which even then was perceived as a threat to the competitiveness of U.S. industries. Given
the uncertainty over whether developing countries will commit
to emissions limits in the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, U.S. legislation will need to include competitiveness measures to compensate for non-participation by developing nations
in future international climate change agreements.14
In fact, in a white paper produced by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce and its Subcommittee on Energy and Air
Quality (the “White Paper”), the
drafters emphasized the need
for competitiveness measures
by linking them to the need
to engage developing countries.15 They reasoned that, in
the absence of an international
agreement binding developing
nations, domestic legislation
needed to be structured in a way
that would encourage developing nations to adopt similar
limitations on GHG emissions
domestically, and that such
“encouragement” could include
border adjustment measures,
performance standards, and carbon market design conditions.16
The above emphasizes a
second reason for competitiveness measures: they can also serve to encourage foreign countries
to adopt their own domestic climate change measures. Foreign
countries can be encouraged to adopt emissions limits by providing them with both positive and negative incentives to do
so through U.S. legislation. Border adjustment measures could
encourage the adoption of emissions limits in foreign countries
in response to foreign manufacturers having to raise manufacturing costs by purchasing emissions credits. Alternatively, U.S.
legislation could create positive incentives for foreign countries
to adopt emissions caps by providing them with greater access to
the U.S. emissions credit trading market, which is expected to be
vast and lucrative for those able to sell credits on it.17
Third, the imposition of competitiveness measures can prevent “carbon leakage,” a situation where the benefits of reducing U.S. emissions would be “offset by increased emissions
elsewhere by foreign competitors that are thriving as a result of
higher costs in the United States.”18 They could also be used as
export adjustments, i.e., by providing emissions credits for free

to U.S. manufacturers to allow them to compete equally in thirdcountry markets with foreign competitors who are not subject to
emissions caps.19
Finally, competitiveness measures would ensure that other
countries share the cost of reducing GHG emissions on a worldwide basis, even if they are unwilling to adopt required limits
on emissions themselves. Given that the ill effects of climate
change are shared globally, the costs and burdens of eliminating
emissions should also be shared globally. Domestic competitiveness measures can ensure the equal distribution of costs in
the absence of an international agreement limiting emissions.20

Existing Border Adjustment Proposals
While a number of border adjustment proposals in draft legislation have been tabled to date, the Boxer Amendment represents the most comprehensive legislative effort to date. Although
Senator Boxer currently is drafting new legislation, it is likely
that her new proposals will
reflect the proposals made in
the original Boxer Amendment.
While the Waxman-Markey
draft and Representative Chris
Van Hollen’s Cap and Dividend
Act of 2009 represent efforts
currently under consideration in
the 111th Congress, neither is as
specific as the Boxer Amendment on the border adjustment
measures.
The border adjustment proposal in the Boxer Amendment
essentially requires that, beginning from January 1, 2014, “covered goods”21 from countries
that have not taken “comparable
action”22 to the actions taken in
the United States to limit GHG emissions, must be accompanied
by an appropriate number of emissions allowances in order to be
imported into the United States.
Specifically, this proposal would be executed by first,
establishing a bi-partisan “International Climate Change Commission” (the “Commission”) consisting of six commissioners
appointed by the President in coordination with the Senate.23 The
Commission’s key role would be to determine annually which
countries have or have not taken comparable action to combat
greenhouse gas emissions and to publish those determinations.
Countries that are found to have taken comparable action, or
that meet certain exemptions,24 are placed on an “excluded” list
by the Commission.25 Importers of covered goods from these
countries would not be required to submit emissions allowances
under these regulations. All other countries would be placed on
the “covered” list, and covered goods would have to be accompanied by emissions allowances when imported into the United
States.26 The Commission would have enforcement powers

Carbon leakage is a
real concern in light of
the possibility of a
post-Kyoto Protocol
international climate
change agreement without
equivalent obligations
undertaken by all heavy
GHG emitters.
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to penalize companies importing goods without the required
emissions credits.27 Such penalties could include payment of a
penalty and even a prohibition on importing the goods in controversy for up to five years.28
Under the Boxer Amendment, emissions allowances
needed to accompany covered goods would come from a special
reserve of allowances established by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “Administrator”), which would also be
responsible for establishing the pricing methodology29 for these
allowances. The Administrator additionally would be responsible for establishing a method for determining the number of
allowances necessary for covered goods entirely manufactured
and processed in one covered country, using a general formula30
for calculating the number of allowances required “on a per unit
basis for each category of covered goods that are entered into
the United States from that foreign country during each compliance year.”31 The Administrator would further be responsible
for establishing the methodology for determining the number of
allowances to be applied to covered goods manufactured or processed in multiple foreign countries.32
Finally, while most emissions allowances would come
from the special reserve mentioned above, the Boxer Amendment also allows U.S. importers to submit allowances issued by
foreign cap-and-trade programs that are deemed to constitute
“comparable action.”33 U.S. importers may also use credits from
international offset projects authorized by the Administrator in
lieu of international reserve allowances.34 These international
offsets would be authorized as part of Title XIII Subtitle B of the
Boxer Amendment, which describes international partnership
programs such as the reduction of deforestation.35
The border adjustment measure of the Waxman-Markey
draft differs from the Boxer Amendment in significant ways.
The principal difference is that while the Boxer Amendment
mandates that the border adjustment become effective from
2014, the Waxman-Markey draft gives the President the discretion to impose a border adjustment, after making a determination that compliance with the U.S. cap-and-trade system
continues to cause significant reductions in domestic production
or domestic jobs, or an increase in greenhouse gas emissions by
foreign manufacturing facilities manufacturing covered goods
in jurisdictions without “commensurate” GHG regulations.36
This determination is expected to be made no later than June
30, 2017, as part of a reporting process by the President with
the EPA.37 If the President decides to impose a border adjustment, he must issue regulations no later than 24 months after the
determination.38 From that point on, covered goods may only be
imported into the United States with the appropriate number of
allowances.39
The Waxman-Markey draft vaguely describes the parameters for the border adjustment program, with the result that there
are only a few points of comparison with the Boxer Amendment
provisions. One similarity is that both drafts specify exemptions
permitted for least-developed countries and countries emitting
less than 0.5% of total global GHG emissions (i.e., a de minimis
rule).40 The differences, however, are numerous. For instance,
15

the border adjustment in the Waxman-Markey draft clearly states
its intent of addressing “competitive imbalance” as a result of
“direct and indirect” costs of complying with both the U.S. capand-trade system and systems of other countries.41 Moreover,
the definition of “covered goods” in the Waxman-Markey draft
for purposes of the border adjustment measure does not broadly
include imports of “manufactured items for consumption,” but
only those designated as “primary products.”42
Another principal difference in the Waxman-Markey draft,
which also has significant bearing on this discussion, is that—in
order to avoid the problem of carbon leakage43 while preserving
the global competitiveness of industries affected by the carbon
caps—the draft utilizes another competitiveness measure in the
first instance to distribute “rebates” (essentially free credits) to
the “owners and operators of entities in eligible industry sectors,” beginning in 2012.44 Under this primary competitiveness mechanism, eligible industries would first be determined
depending on whether they have an energy intensity or greenhouse gas intensity of at least five percent, and a trade intensity
of at least fifteen percent, as calculated by the EPA Administrator according to methods described in the draft text.45 According
to the draft, the number of rebates given to each eligible entity
would equal “the sum of the covered entity’s direct compliance
factor and the covered entity’s indirect carbon factor.”46 The
draft further mandates an annual review of the rebate program,
and allows for the EPA, beginning in 2021, to eliminate rebates
if the Administrator determines that “more than 70 percent of
the global output from a sector . . . is manufactured in countries
subject to commensurate greenhouse gas regulation.”47
Importantly, the Waxman-Markey draft, unlike a number of
earlier proposals, particularly emphasizes the need for the adoption of clean technologies, clean energy sources, and energy efficiency. For example, the draft proposes the adoption of a “smart
grid” to improve energy efficiency; the adoption of technologies
such as carbon capture and sequestration to reduce emissions in
the air; and the provision of U.S. assistance to the developing
world to encourage them to adopt clean technologies.48
The Cap and Dividend Act of 200949 is the most recent legislation to be introduced imposing a border adjustment measure.
The measure differs radically from the Boxer Amendment and
Waxman-Markey draft provisions, in that it requires the imposition of “carbon equivalency fees” on all imports of “carbonintensive goods.”50 The carbon equivalency fee would equal the
dollar value amounts domestic producers have to pay to acquire
carbon permits for the production of their goods, and any carbon
equivalency fees paid by importers for carbon-intensive goods
used in the production of their final manufactured items.51 This
carbon equivalency fee would in turn be paid out to domestic
producers of carbon intensive goods, to make up for the costs
they incur.52 This provision will be terminated in the event that
an international agreement is reached requiring carbon-emitting
countries to adopt similar measures, or when carbon-emitting
countries unilaterally adopt equivalent measures to those of the
United States.53
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Prior and subsequent to the Boxer Amendment last year,
both the Senate and the House of Representatives had introduced
a number of bills containing border adjustment measures, which
differed more or less substantially from the Boxer Amendment.
S.3036, which the Boxer Amendment replaced, for example,
contained significant differences in the timing of implementation, structure of oversight and implementation bodies, and the
definition of certain terms.54
Two pieces of legislation proposed in the House of Representatives also included border adjustment measures: H.R.6186, the
Investing in Climate Action and Protection Act (“H.R.6186”),55
introduced by Representative Markey, and H.R.6316, the Climate, Market, Auction, Trust & Trade Emissions Reduction
System Act of 2008 (“H.R.6316”),56 introduced by Representative Lloyd Doggett.
The terms of the border adjustment measures under
H.R.6186 are very similar to, if more simplistic than, S.3036. If
H.R.6186 is the House’s counterpart to S.3036, then H.R.6316
serves as the House’s counterpart to the Boxer Amendment.
Much of the terms and structure of H.R.6316 replicates the proposals in the Boxer Amendment. The fact that H.R.6316 was
the latest piece of climate change legislation introduced into the
House, and that it so closely echoes the direction and details of
the Boxer Amendment, again reinforces the notion that these
pieces of legislation will likely form the basis of some of the
future legislative efforts to regulate GHG emissions, particularly
on the Senate side.57

Are the Existing Border Adjustment
Proposals Consistent with World Trade
Organization Rules?
This section provides a brief overview of WTO rules that
could be implicated by the border adjustment proposals described
in the previous section, and discusses whether the proposals
would survive scrutiny under those rules. Because the proposals
for U.S. legislation are incomplete and likely to be substantially
revised prior to passage, it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions about the outcome of any future WTO challenge. However, notwithstanding this uncertainty, it is already quite clear
which WTO rules would be implicated in such a challenge, and
these rules provide an important roadmap for legislators hoping
to “appeal-proof” a final bill.
At least three distinct WTO agreements could come into
play in a challenge to U.S. border adjustment measures. The
first is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).58
The relevant GATT provisions can be divided into two groups—
first, the fundamental trade principles that WTO Members must
uphold, and second, defenses that may be asserted to justify a
breach. Thus, a finding of a violation of one or more of the fundamental principles may not necessarily lead to termination of a
challenged measure if a legitimate defense is available.
One fundamental trade principle likely to come into play
if legislation like the Boxer Amendment enters into force is the
most-favored nation (“MFN”) clause of GATT Article I. The
MFN clause at Article I:1 provides, writ large, that if a WTO
Spring 2009

Member gives advantageous treatment to imports of a given
product from one WTO Member, it must provide the same
advantageous treatment to imports of the “like product” from
all the other Members as well. In short, a WTO Member may
not discriminate by providing better treatment to imports from
some countries than to imports from other countries. The obligation set forth in Article I:1 is broad, applying “with respect
to all rules and formalities in connection with imports.” Yet,
the Boxer Amendment at Section 1316(b)(3) would seem to
require this very mode of prohibited discrimination by imposing
the importer allowance requirement on imports from countries
deemed not to have taken “comparable action” to the United
States to combat climate change, while relieving imports from
other countries of this obligation. The MFN clause would thus
seem to present a significant hurdle under the WTO rules for
border adjustment mechanisms like the Boxer Amendment that
treat imports from different countries differently.
Another GATT principle potentially implicated by border measures is set forth in Article II, pursuant to which WTO
Members have agreed to “bind,” or fix, their customs duties on
imports at levels laid out in national schedules of concessions.
Under Article II:1(b), WTO Members have committed not to
impose customs duties in excess of their bound levels. Notably, this obligation extends to “all other duties or charges of any
kind.” The terms “all” and “of any kind” in this provision appear
to encompass an importer allowance requirement of the sort proposed by the Boxer Amendment.
The GATT contains another important prohibition on tradediscriminatory treatment—the national treatment provisions of
Article III. The general thrust of these provisions is that a WTO
Member must accord treatment to goods imported from other
WTO Members that is no worse than the treatment accorded
to domestically produced “like” goods. Any border adjustment
measure that imposes higher compliance burdens on imported
goods than it imposes on domestically produced goods could run
afoul of this national treatment requirement. Two elements of
Article III are most likely to come into play in challenges to border adjustment measures. The first is the requirement of Article
III:2 that imports shall not be subject to “internal taxes or other
internal charges” that exceed those applied to the “like” domestic products. The second is the requirement of Article III:4 that
imports shall be subject to regulatory treatment that is no less
favorable than that accorded to “like” products of domestic origin. A considerable body of WTO jurisprudence helps define
the scope of these obligations—including the perpetually tricky
question of how to define a “like” product.59 Unlike the vulnerability of an importer allowance program under the abovementioned GATT provisions, it seems possible for lawmakers
to craft a program that would impose comparable burdens on
imported and domestically produced goods alike. However,
there is no broad guarantee that such an effort would succeed;
if challenged, compliance with national treatment principles
may have to be assessed on a product-by-product basis, and
any incremental increase in the compliance burden imposed on
importers could render the program vulnerable.
16

Yet another GATT provision that may be implicated by
border measures is Article XI:1, pursuant to which WTO Members may impose “no prohibitions or restrictions [on imports]
other than duties, taxes, or other charges.” This proscription
could readily be seen as applying to border measures intended to
deter carbon leakage such as importer allowance requirements—
particularly if the market price for allowances were to rise to a
level rendering importation cost-prohibitive.
As noted, a WTO Member may violate one of these fundamental principles, but still be able to justify the violation. Doing
so would require invocation of one or more of the “General
Exceptions” set forth in GATT Article XX. Two of the enumerated exceptions are generally understood as providing possible
cover for border adjustment provisions in a GHG emissions capand-trade scheme. The first is sub-article (b), for measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” and the
second is sub-article (g), for measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption.” Both of these exceptions appear sufficiently
broad for lawmakers to craft border measures to fit within their
parameters. Further, as a matter of intent, the GATT appears to
leave room for WTO Members to pursue their own environmental policies and does not attempt to harmonize national policies.
However, fitting a measure within one of the Article XX
sub-articles is not the end of the inquiry. Any defense of a measure under Article XX must also survive the test laid out in the
chapeau of that Article itself, which provides that the measure
may not be applied “in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.” In short, Article XX
does not shield protectionism masquerading as environmentalism. Would border adjustment measures that are, on their face,
intended to safeguard U.S. industries from foreign competitors
deemed to have an unfair cost advantage survive scrutiny under
the Article XX chapeau? Opinions on this question vary, and the
answer would ultimately depend both on the final wording of
U.S. legislation as well as how it is implemented.
Further, a considerable body of WTO jurisprudence now
exists on the Article XX chapeau, and provides some considerations likely to be applied in any challenge to U.S. border adjustment measures. For example, in the recent Brazil-Tyres case,
the WTO Appellate Body struck down a Brazilian import ban
on retreaded tires that exempted imports from MERCOSUR60
countries. In a key passage in its holding, the Appellate Body
reasoned that the trade discrimination (i.e., imports were generally prohibited, but not if originating in MERCOSUR countries) at issue was not “rationally related” to the environmental
objective of the import ban.61 Another consideration likely to
arise in any challenge to final U.S. border adjustment measures
stems from the much-cited U.S.-Shrimp case, in which the WTO
Appellate Body explained that the legitimacy of an environmental measure with a trade-discriminatory impact may be shown
through earnest attempts by the importing country to negotiate
an international agreement that would ensure equal treatment of
17

all affected trading partners. Under this test, a “serious, good
faith effort” to discuss a global climate change mitigation regime
may be sufficient.62
A second WTO agreement that may be invoked to challenge
U.S. border adjustment measures in cap-and-trade legislation is
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”). The TBT Agreement guides the application of technical
regulations and standards in order to avoid unnecessary obstructions to trade. Technical regulations are defined in Annex 1 of
the TBT Agreement as “document[s] which [lay] down product
characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with
which compliance is mandatory.”63 This definition may extend
to requirements dealing with packaging, labeling, and marking.
In the context of border adjustment measures, if the measures
require that products be produced in accordance with certain
emissions control criteria in order to be imported freely into the
United States, for instance, this could trigger a TBT Agreement
challenge. Although none of the current proposals contain criteria that could be defined as a “technical regulation” for purposes
of the TBT Agreement, the alternative proposal described at
the end of this paper—as well as other proposals by commentators64—could trigger a challenge under these provisions.
There are four possible ways in which a challenge may
be raised against border adjustment measures under the TBT
Agreement. First, like the MFN and national treatment clauses
described in the GATT discussion above, TBT Agreement Article 2.1 requires that technical regulations must apply “no less
favorably” to “like products” of WTO Members than to “like
products” of national origin or of other countries.65
Second, under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, technical
regulations must not be drafted or applied in a way that creates
an “unnecessary obstacle to trade,” or more specifically, must
not be “more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.”66 However, under Article 2.2, legitimate objectives may include protection of the environment. Therefore, if
the U.S. Government were able to prove adequately that its technical regulations were designed to fulfill the objective of protecting the environment, and did not do so in an overly-restrictive
manner, then the technical regulations could survive a challenge
under this provision.
Third, the TBT Agreement mandates under Article 2.4
that, where international standards exist, they must be used as
a standard for WTO Members’ technical regulations.67 In this
case, no such global standards exist, but if new standards were
adopted pursuant to the UN climate change negotiations, then
these would necessarily have to serve as the basis of any technical regulations adopted in the United States, and if not, U.S.
regulations could be subject to a challenge under this provision
of the Agreement.
Finally, TBT Article 12 requires that WTO Members take
into account developing countries in applying technical regulations, particularly to ensure that such technical regulations do
not impose unnecessary obstacles to trade with these developing countries.68 Although most border adjustment measures
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

proposed so far specifically exempt countries designated by the
UN as “least developed” countries, any legislation imposing
technical regulations should take this requirement into account
as well.69
The third WTO agreement that may come into play in a challenge to a U.S. competitiveness provision more generally is the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM
Agreement”).70 Exposure to claims under the SCM Agreement
could arise in several ways. One possibility, applicable to a
competitiveness measure that allocates emissions allowances to
some domestic manufacturing industries (but not others) at no
charge, would be a claim that the provision of free allowances
under such circumstances constitutes an actionable subsidy.71
Such a claim could be premised on a definition of “subsidy,” at
Article 1.1(a)(ii), which covers government decisions to forego
revenue that is otherwise due.72 However, for such a claim to
succeed, the alleged subsidy would also have to be “specific” for
purposes of Article 2—i.e., limited by law or in fact to certain
enterprises or industries. Further, a complaining WTO Member
could only prevail in such a case by demonstrating, under Article 5, that the alleged subsidy is causing “adverse effects” to its
interests.73 The obstacles to success in such a challenge would
be relatively high.
While not directly related to the adoption of competitiveness measures, a second way in which the SCM Agreement
might be implicated in relation to a national cap-and-trade program is through the government’s use of proceeds from the
sale of emissions permits. As noted earlier, President Obama’s
climate change agenda calls for substantial government investment in a range of clean energy technologies. It seems feasible
that such expenditures might be challenged by foreign governments seeking to nurture competing industries as impermissible
or actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement. Notably, the
SCM Agreement at its inception contained provisions insulating
certain “green box” subsidies described in Article 8.2(c) from
challenge.74 However, these exceptions were of limited duration, and expired in 2000 when the WTO Members could not
agree on their continuation.75 The expiration of these provisions
injects further uncertainty into the WTO risk analysis for any
national cap-and-trade system designed to promote clean energy
technologies.
Finally, the prospect of a WTO challenge to any competitiveness provisions that might ultimately be adopted raises litigation risk questions entirely apart from the application of the
above-mentioned rules. One of the worst-case scenarios would
be the imposition of different types of competitiveness provisions by different jurisdictions, spawning multiple and overlapping WTO challenges. The Director-General of the WTO, Pascal
Lamy, has referred to such a scenario as a “spaghetti bowl,” and
described the institutional problems it could raise for the WTO.76
In this scenario, the WTO’s dispute settlement process may well
be overwhelmed, both by the magnitude and complexity of the
legal issues as well as the unprecedented trade values affected
by the challenged measures. Further, regardless of the results of
any WTO challenge to climate competitiveness measures, the
Spring 2009

imposition of the measures themselves may poison the ongoing
UN negotiations towards a new global accord and invite retaliatory action.
These fears, even if speculative, point to the need for an
international climate change agreement in which all countries—
developed and developing—accept responsibility for reducing
worldwide GHG emissions. Indeed, this is the only viable solution to the climate change problem, and the only “exit strategy”
for countries that have or will unilaterally implement cap-andtrade systems domestically. Even if competitiveness measures
pass WTO muster, they are only temporary measures until
a global solution on climate change is achieved. In the meantime, domestic political reality in the United States (and in other
advanced economies) dictates that no domestic GHG cap-andtrade scheme can achieve adequate political support if it does
not ensure the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing
industries in light of the developing countries’ current stance on
prioritizing “development” over carbon reduction. Thus, designing competitiveness measures—and specifically border adjustment measures—to maximize their chances of surviving a WTO
challenge, to the extent permitted by domestic political reality,
remains the task at hand.

Minimizing the Risk that a Border Adjustment
Measure Will Run Afoul of WTO Rules
The preceding sections show that robust border adjustment
measures are a sine qua non of any final U.S. cap-and-trade system that may be enacted, but also that any such measure could
be subjected to a dizzying array of claims under WTO rules.
How, then, might the risk of reversal in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings be reduced?
As noted in the previous section, one of the key design challenges for border adjustment measures from a WTO risk reduction perspective is how to avoid overt—and unlawful—trade
discrimination. One way to avoid at least the surface appearance
of discriminatory treatment would be to design a measure so that
it does not apply at the border at all, but at the point of consumption within the U.S. economy, for all emissions-intensive goods
deemed to be vulnerable to carbon leakage.
Ideally, such a mechanism—which could take the form of
a requirement to submit certain standardized amounts of GHG
emissions allowances or offsets per quantity of the products at
issue77—would apply to all GHG-intensive products, regardless of country of manufacture. Refunds or rebates would then
be provided to suppliers able to certify that the products were
produced subject to a requirement to submit such allowances
or offsets (regardless of jurisdiction of submission).78 In other
words, this adjustment measure would be geared to an objective
emissions standard that is not, on its face, based on the country
of manufacture of the product. The difficulty, of course, would
be in the determination of the amount of allowances or offsets
required per product, which could raise concerns under the TBT
Agreement as previously noted.
The appearance of discriminatory treatment could be further
reduced if suppliers would be permitted to satisfy the standard
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based on the emissions intensity of the manufacturer of the product at issue, as opposed to average emissions intensity for the
sector in the country of manufacture, as currently envisioned
under the Waxman-Markey draft. This would have the added
benefit of encouraging the adoption of more efficient manufacturing technologies—regardless of the country in which they are
deployed.
The above approach, while reducing the chances of being
found to violate the GATT’s non-discrimination principles and
border requirements, could also help buttress a defense under
GATT Article XX. As noted in the previous section, a GATT
Article XX defense can succeed only where the challenged measure does not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised trade restriction. Succeeding with
such a defense is more difficult where the measure at issue, on
its face, distinguishes between products based on their country
of manufacture. In such cases, the measure would likely have
at least the appearance of unwarranted trade discrimination—
especially if the ostensible purpose of the provision is to safeguard the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing industries.
However, if the operation of the competitiveness measure can be
moved from the border to the point of consumption in the U.S.

economy, as proposed above, and where it operates based on
an objective standard of manufacturing emissions intensity, it
should be easier to demonstrate that the measure truly advances
an environmental goal covered by one of the Article XX exceptions, and does not constitute a disguised trade restriction.

Conclusion
It is our hope that this article generates additional thought
and discussion as part of the U.S. legislative process in 2009
to craft an effective domestic cap-and-trade system, including
the ability to successfully safeguard the competitiveness of U.S.
firms that would likely have to bear heavier emissions compliance burdens than most of their foreign competitors. Carbon
leakage is a real concern in light of the possibility of a postKyoto Protocol international climate change agreement without
equivalent obligations undertaken by all heavy GHG emitters.
An effective and WTO-consistent adjustment measure (whether
applied at the border or at the point of consumption)—among
all of the competitiveness measures—appears to stand the best
chance of encouraging developing countries to meaningfully
participate in a global solution to a global problem.
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See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 4 (Nicholas Inst.,
Working Paper no. 07-02, 2007), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/
institute/internationaltradelaw.pdf.
21 A “covered good” is defined as:
[A] good that (as identified by the EPA Administrator by rule
(A) is a primary product or manufactured item for consumption;
(B) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the good, a substantial quantity of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect
greenhouse gas emissions; and (C) is closely related to a good the
cost of production of which in the United States is affected by a
requirement of [the Boxer Amendment].
Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1311(7). In § 1311(16), “primary
product” is defined as:
(A) iron, steel, steel mill products (including pipe and tube), aluminum, cement, glass (including flat, container, and specialty glass,
and fiberglass), pulp, paper, chemicals, or industrial ceramics; or
(B) any other manufactured product that—(i) is sold in bulk for purposes of further manufacture or inclusion in a finished product; and
(ii) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the product, direct
greenhouse gas emissions or indirect greenhouse gas emissions that
are comparable (on an emissions-per-output basis) to emissions
generated in the manufacture of products by covered entities in the
industrial sector.
Id. § 1311(16).
22 “Comparable action” is defined in the Boxer Amendment as “greenhouse
gas regulatory programs, requirements and other measures adopted by a foreign
country that, in combination, are comparable in effect to actions carried out
by the United States through federal, state and local measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions, as determined by the Commission.” The determination of
whether a country has taken comparable action will be based on the following
requirements, in compliance with applicable international agreements:
(i) A foreign country is deemed to have taken comparable action
if the Commission determines that (I) the percentage change in
greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign country during the relevant
period is equal to, or better than, (II) the percentage change in greenhouse gas emissions in the United States during the same period.
The Commission will develop rules for taking into account net
transfers to and from the United States and other foreign countries
of greenhouse‐gas allowances and other emission credits.
(ii) If a foreign country it not deemed to have taken comparable
action under clause (i), the Commission will take into consideration,
the extent to which all of the following actions that have the effect
of limiting greenhouse‐gas emissions in the foreign country have
been taken during the relevant period, and that these actions have
been fully implemented, verified and enforced: (I) the deployment
and use of state‐of‐the‐art technologies in industrial processes, equipment manufacturing facilities, power generation and other energy
facilities, consumer goods (such as automobiles and appliances) and
implementation of other techniques or actions that have the effect of
limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign country during the
relevant period; and (II) any regulatory programs, requirements, and
other measures that the foreign country has implemented to limit
greenhouse gas emissions during the relevant period.
Id. § 1311(4).
23 Id. § 1314.
24 Exemptions include foreign countries (i) that have been classified as a
least-developed developing country by the United Nations, or (ii) whose share
of total global greenhouse gas emissions is below the de minimis percentage
defined in the Boxer Amendment as “0.5% of total global greenhouse gas emissions for the most recent calendar year for which relevant data is available,
taking into consideration the annual average deforestation rate during a representative period for a developing foreign country.” Id. § 1316(b)(2).
25 Id. § 1316(b)(2).
26 Id. § 1316(b)(3).
27 Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1314.
28 Id. §§ 1314(d)(1)-(2).
29 Id. § 1316(a)(3).
30 The “general formula” is defined as:
[T]he international reserve allowance requirement, as described in
paragraph (1), for a compliance year is equal to the product obtained
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by multiplying (A) the national greenhouse gas intensity rate for
each category of covered goods of each covered foreign country for
the compliance year, as determined by the Administrator under paragraph (3); by (B) the allowance adjustment factor for the industry
sector in the foreign country that manufactured the covered goods
entered into the United States, as determined by the Administrator
under paragraph (4); by (C) the economic adjustment ratio for the
foreign country, as determined by the Commission under paragraph (5).
Id. § 1316(d)(2).
The “national greenhouse gas intensity rate” is calculated by the Administrator:
[F]or a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(A), on a
per unit basis, in an amount equal to the quotient obtained by dividing (A) the total amount of direct greenhouse gas emissions and
indirect greenhouse‐gas emissions that are attributable to a category
of covered goods of a covered foreign country during the most calendar year (as adjusted to exclude those emissions that would not be
subject to the allowance submission requirements of section 202 for
the category of covered goods if manufactured in the United States);
by (B) total number of units of the particular covered good that are
produced in the covered foreign country during the same calendar
year.
Id.
The “allowance adjustment factor” is calculated by the Administrator:
[F]or a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(B) in
an amount that is equal to 1 minus the ratio that (i) the number of
allowances, as determined by the Administrator under subparagraph
(4)(B), that an entire industry sector in the foreign country would
have received at no cost if such allowances were allocated in the
same manner that allowances are allocated at no cost under Titles V
through XI to the same industry sector in the United States; bears to
(ii) the total amount of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect
greenhouse‐gas emissions that are attributable to a category of covered goods of a covered foreign country during a particular compliance year.
Id.
“Allowances allocated at no cost” are calculated by the Administrator:
[I]n an amount equal to the product obtained by multiplying—(i) the
baseline emissions level that the Commission has attributed to a category of covered goods of a foreign country; by (ii) the ratio that—
(I) the quantity of allowances that are allocated at no cost under
Titles V through XI to entities within the industry sector that manufactures the covered goods for the compliance year during which the
covered goods were entered into the United States; bears to (II) the
total amount of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect greenhouse gas emissions of that sector during the same compliance year.
Finally:
[T]he Administrator shall apply an economic adjustment ratio of 1
for a particular foreign country under subparagraph (2)(C) unless
the Commission makes an affirmative decision to lower the ratio
in order to take into account all of the following actions that the
foreign country has taken during the relevant period, and that these
actions have been fully implemented, verified, and enforced—(A)
the deployment and use of state of the art technologies in industrial
processes, equipment manufacturing facilities, power generation and
other energy facilities, consumer goods (such as automobiles and
appliances) and implementation of other techniques or actions that
have the effect of limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the foreign
country during the relevant period; and (B) any regulatory programs,
requirements, and other measures that the foreign country has implemented to limit greenhouse gas emissions during the relevant period.
Boxer Amendment to S.3036, 110th Cong. § 1316(d)(2).
31 Id. § 1316(d)(1)(B).
32 Under this methodology, each importer would (i) determine for each covered foreign country the number of allowances that apply to the category of
covered goods manufactured and processed entirely in that covered foreign
country for that compliance year; and (ii) of the allowance requirements identified for particular covered foreign countries, apply the requirement that imposes
the highest number of allowances for the category of covered goods. The
Administrator may allow importers to apply an alternate method for establishing this requirement, but only if the importer demonstrates in an administrative
hearing by a preponderance of evidence that the alternate method will establish
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an international reserve allowance requirement that is more representative than
the applicable requirement. Id. § 1316(d)(8).
33 Such programs represent a “comparable action” if the Administrator certifies that the program (i) places a quantitative limitation on the total quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions of the covered foreign country in terms of tons emitted per year and achieves that limitation through an allowance trading system;
(ii) satisfies criteria established by the Administrator for requirements relating
to the enforceability of the cap and trade program, including requirements for
monitoring, reporting, verification procedures, and allowance tracking; and (iii)
is a comparable action. Id. § 1316(e)(1).
34 Id. § 1316(e)(2).
35 Id. § 1316(e)(2)(A).
36 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Discussion Draft, 111th
Cong. § 414(b) [hereinafter American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009].
Furthermore, a country will be determined to have:
[C]ommensurate greenhouse gas regulation if (1) the country’s
annual greenhouse gas intensity or energy intensity (as described
in section 403(b)) for a sector or sub-sector is equal to or less than
the greenhouse gas intensity or energy intensity for such sector or
sub-sector in the United States in the most recent calendar year for
which reliable data are available; or (2) the country has implemented
policies, including sectoral caps, export tariffs, or production fees,
that individually or collectively place a price on greenhouse gas
emissions from a sector or sub-sector that is at least 60 percent of
the cost of complying with title VII of the Clean Air Act in the
United States for such sector or sub-sector, averaged over a two-year
period.
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, § 405(b)(2).
37 Id. § 414(a).
38 Id. § 416(a).
39 Id. § 415.
40 Id. § 416(a)(1)(C).
41 Id. § 416(a)(2).
42 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, supra note 36, § 411(1).
This section specifies “iron, steel, steel mill products (including pipe and tube),
aluminum, cement, glass (including flat, container, and specialty glass and
fiberglass), pulp, paper, chemicals, and industrial ceramics” as “primary products.” It also provides a “catch-all” sub-provision covering
[A]ny other manufactured product that (i) is sold in bulk for purposes of further manufacture or inclusion in a finished product; and
(ii) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the product, direct
greenhouse gas emissions or indirect greenhouse gas emissions that
are comparable (on an emissions-per-output basis) to emissions generated in the manufacture of products [that were specifically listed
earlier].
Id.
43 Id. § 402(b)(1). Carbon leakage is defined as “any substantial increase (as
determined by the Administrator) in [GHG] emissions by manufacturing entities located in countries without commensurate [GHG] regulation, provided
that such increase is caused by an incremental cost of production increase in the
United States resulting from the implementation of title VII of the Clean Air
Act.”
44 Id. § 403(a).
45 Id. § 403(b).
46 Id. § 403(c). The direct compliance factor is equal to the “product of (i) the
output of the covered entity; and (ii) 85 percent of the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent) per unit of output for all
covered entities in the sector or sub-sector, as determined by the Administrator
based on reports provided under subparagraph (C).” The “indirect carbon factor for an entity for a calendar year is the product obtained by multiplying the
output of the covered entity by both the emissions intensity factor determined
pursuant to clause (i) and the electricity efficiency factor determined pursuant to
clause (ii) for the year concerned.” The “emissions intensity factor” in a regulated electricity market is “the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of
carbon dioxide equivalents) per kilowatt hour of the electricity purchased by the
covered entity, as determined by the Administrator based on reports provided
under subparagraph (D).” “In a wholesale competitive electricity market, the
emissions intensity factor is the average [GHG] emissions (expressed in tons of
carbon dioxide equivalents) per kilowatt hour of the marginal source of supply
of electricity purchased by the covered entity, as determined by the Administrator `based on reports provided under subparagraph (D).” “The electricity
efficiency factor is 85 percent of the average amount of electricity (in kilowatt
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hours) used per unit of output for all covered entities in the relevant sector or
sub-sector, as determined by the Administrator based on reports provided under
subparagraph (C).”
47 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, supra note 36, § 405(b).
48 See id. Titles I and IV.
49 Also known as H.R. 1862, the bill was introduced on April 1, 2009 and was
referred to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 1862, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
50 Id. § 2.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 S.3036, 110th Cong. § 6006 (2008). An important difference between the
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